Abstract
Introduction
Flooding-based DDoS attacks present a very serious threat to the stability of the Internet [1, 2] . Usually, these attacks involve many compromised hosts amassed to send a large number of useless packets to jam a victim, or its Internet connection, or both. SYN flooding, UDP flooding and ICMP flooding are all typical flooding-based DDoS attacks. In this paper, we take UDP flooding as an example to demonstrate our perspective in mitigating flooding-based DDoS attacks by queue scheduling disciplines.
UDP flooding is a DoS attack using the User Datagram Protocol, a sessionless/connectionless computer networking protocol. UDP flooding can be initiated by sending a large number of UDP packets to random ports on a remote host. As a result, the distant host will (i) check for the application listening at that port; (ii) see that no application listens at that port; (iii) reply with an ICMP Destination Unreachable packet. Thus, for a large number of UDP packets, the victimized system will be forced into sending lots of ICMP packets, eventually leading it to be unreachable by other clients. The attacking sources may also spoof the IP address of the UDP packets to conceal their locations and ensure the excessive ICMP return packets do not reach them [3, 4] .
Queueing disciplines are rules of deciding the way an arriving packet should be served. It is the key to fairly sharing resources when multiple packets compete for a common outgoing link. In this paper, we focus on Stochastic Fairness Queueing (SFQ) [5, 6] , which is a simple implementation of the fair queueing algorithms family. Although SFQ is less accurate than others, it requires fewer calculations while being almost perfectly fair. The key word in SFQ is conversation (or flow), which mostly corresponds to a TCP session or a UDP stream. Traffic is divided into a pretty large number of FIFO queues, one for each conversation. Traffic is then sent in a round robin fashion, giving each conversation the chance to send data in turn [7] . SFQ is called "Stochastic" because it does not really allocate a queue for each conversation; instead, it has an algorithm which divides traffic over a limited number of queues using a hashing algorithm. Because of the hash, multiple conversations might end up in the same bucket, leading to bandwidth sharing.
The motivation for this work comes from such a fact that flooding-based DDoS attacks abuse network resources while queueing disciplines aim at managing competition for link bandwidth [8] . Then, a question is raised: can queueing disciplines help us mitigate flooding-based DDoS attacks? In [9] , Felix Lau et.al. found CBQ (Class-Based Queueing) can guarantee bandwidth for certain classes of input flows under persistent DDoS attacks. In this paper, a different perspective is taken and emphasis is laid on classless queueing disciplines such as First Come First Served (FCFS) and SFQ. The link bandwidth is assumed to be shared equally among all kinds of applications. Based on the simulation 
Simulation scenarios
Using the simulation tools, we examine how FCFS and SFQ implemented in a network router perform during a UDP flooding attack, and whether normal applications can obtain desired bandwidth from the bottleneck link.
Firstly, we use the NS-2 network simulator to simulate UDP flooding attacks on a targeted router. Simulations are conducted using such a network topology as shown in Figure 1 . It consists of 10 normal applications labeled as N1~N10 and 6 attacking sources labeled as N11~N16. All users are distributed in 7 networks where the accessing routers are labeled as R_2~R_8. Node R_9 represents the victim. Node R_1 is abstraction of all the routers and links between R_9 and the accessing routers (R_2~R_8). The link between R_9 and R_1 is the bottleneck link.
Figure 1 Simulated network topology
Secondly, all normal applications are defined as TCP agents because it is reported that 95% of the total bytes and 85% of the total packets in Internet are transported over TCP connections [10, 11] . Each normal application is configured to initiate its connection within 5 seconds from the start of our simulations. Attacking sources are defined as UDP agents sending packets of size 1000 Bytes at a specific rate, and each launches a UDP flooding attack within 1 second after our simulations run for 2 seconds. Configuration of links between users and their accessing routers is 1Mbps bandwidth, 5ms link delay and 50 packets buffered per link. Configuration of links between routers is 2Mbps bandwidth, 20ms link delay and 50 packets buffered per link. All simulations last 90 seconds.
Lastly, the total throughput of all normal applications on the bottleneck link is used as an indicator of the efficacy of different queueing disciplines in mitigating UDP flooding. The higher the total throughput of normal applications on the bottleneck is, the more effective a queueing discipline is. Figure 2 describes how to calculate total throughput of all normal applications on the bottleneck link.
Performance analysis
Based on the above-mentioned simulation scenarios, a discussion is made in this section on the efficacy and robustness of SFQ and FCFS in mitigating UDP flooding.
Efficacy analysis
Firstly, we ran our simulations with parameters in SFQ and FCFS configured by their default values in NS-2, that is, the number of hashing queue (denoted by buckets in NS-2) in SFQ is 16 and the link buffer size in FCFS is 50 packets. The attacking sources sent flooding packets at a rate of 400 packets/sec (0.4Mbps). Simulation results are shown in Figure 3 .
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Figure 3 Simulation results on SFQ and FCFS with their parameters configured by default
As we can see, SFQ is more effective in mitigating UDP flooding than FCFS. Inefficacy of FCFS can be explained by the following facts: (i) FCFS can not guarantee fairness among network flows [12, 13] ; (ii) normal applications may decrease their sending rate once packets loss is detected [14, 15] . On the other hand, SFQ can guarantee fairness in bandwidth competition, thus some normal applications may obtain allocated bandwidth during a UDP flooding attack. In our simulation scenarios, the proportion of normal applications to attacking sources is 10:6, which means, by fairness, throughput of normal applications may account for 62.5% (namely 1.25Mbps) of the total throughput in the bottleneck link. Simulation results in Figure 3 confirm this inference.
However, little is known on the performance of both disciplines with various parameter configurations from the above results. In fact, there are still two questions to be answered. The first one: does the parameter buckets of SFQ influence its efficacy in mitigating UDP flooding? The second one: can we improve the efficacy of FCFS in mitigating UDP flooding by changing buffer size of the bottleneck link? More simulations were run to answer both questions. For FCFS, we ran simulations with bottleneck link buffer size configured by 30, 80, 100, and 200. Simulation results, which are almost the same as those shown in Figure 3 , show changing link buffer size has little effect on improving the efficacy of FCFS in mitigating UDP flooding.
For SFQ, things are completely different. Simulation results show efficacy of SFQ in mitigating UDP flooding is closely related to its parameter buckets. Figure 4 gives the simulation results when there are 6 attacking sources and the buckets configured in SFQ is 4, 8 and 16 respectively. As we can see, efficacy of SFQ in mitigating UDP flooding is greatly decreased when buckets is far less than the number of traffic flows. This discovery means we can increase the buckets of SFQ as high as possible to mitigate UDP flooding when it occurs.
Figure.4 Simulation results on SFQ configured by different buckets values
Robustness analysis
Robustness of a queueing discipline in mitigating UDP flooding can be judged by its performance in dealing with attacks of different intensity. A queueing discipline is considered robust if it is efficient in mitigating UDP flooding and behaves in a consistent way when dealing with attacks of different intensity. Obviously, FCFS cannot be considered robust because of its inefficacy in mitigating UDP flooding as shown in subsection 3.1. Therefore, we lay emphasis on exploring robustness of SFQ.
Increasing sending rates of the attacking sources is a common way to increase threat of DDoS attacks. In this paper, we wonder if it works when SFQ is in operation at the target network. Since we have known the parameter buckets of SFQ plays a key role in mitigating UDP flooding, it is natural to find out whether this parameter affects the robustness of SFQ and how if it does. Simulations were run with various buckets configured in SFQ and various sending rates by the attacking sources. Simulations on FCFS were also run so that we can draw a comparison between it and SFQ. Figure 5 gives some typical results of our simulations, which show (i) FCFS is not robust because its efficacy deteriorates with the increasing sending rates of the attack sources; (ii) SFQ is robust when its buckets is larger than or approximately equal to the number of network flows.
Figure 5
Simulation results on SFQ and FCFS with attacking sources sending at different rates Another way to increase threat of DDoS attacks is to increase the number of attacking sources while decreasing their sending rates. Attackers want to enhance concealment of the attacking sources by this way. In order to study robustness of SFQ and FCFS in this situation, we ran simulations with various combinations of attacking source number and sending rate. Several typical simulation results on each queueing discipline are given in Figure 6 , where (0.2, 6, 1.2) means there are 6 attacking sources which send UDP packets at the rate of 0.2Mbps and the converged traffic at the target network is 1.2Mbps. As we can see, SFQ loses its robustness when the attacking sources are increased. 
Summary
Mitigating DDoS attacks has been a hot issue in network security. In this paper, we explore the feasibility of mitigating UDP flooding attacks by classless queueing disciplines such as SFQ and FCFS. Simulation results show (i) FCFS is neither efficient nor robust in mitigating UDP flooding; (ii) SFQ is more efficient and more robust when its parameter buckets is larger than or approximately equal to the number of network flows. We hope these results can help in further developing DDoS defense mechanisms. Also, we hope researchers pay more attention to mitigating DDoS attacks by queueing disciplines and present more effective solutions for DDoS defense.
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